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When Can the Courtroom Be Closed 
In Criminal Proceedings? 
The sixth amendment provides that 
"in all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a ... public 
trial .... "1 At the same time, the public 
and the press, under the first amend-
ment, have a right to open criminal pro-
ceedings, including pretrial suppression 
hearings, voir dire, and the trial itself.2 
The right to an open trial is, however, 
not absolute - the trial judge has some 
discretion on whether to close the court-
room to the public and press.3 Closure 
of the courtroom has been held to be 
proper to protect witnesses,4 to pre-
serve order in the court,s and to avoid 
prejudice to either party.6 
This article reviews the development 
of federal and state case law concerning 
the right to an open trial. It suggests that 
a specific, articulable factual determina-
tion should be made, in all circum-
stances, by a trial judge before the court-
room can properly be closed to the 
public and press. The judge must first 
consider other alternatives before order-
ing closure. This article also concludes 
that a closure order should be no broader 
than absolutely necessary. 
Supreme Court Decisions on the 
Right to a Public Trial 
In the case of In re Oliver, 7 the United 
States Supreme Court examined whether 
a judge has the right to charge, convict, 
and sentence a witness to ninety days in 
jail, on the belief that the witness com-
mitted perjury in his courtroom.8 The 
Oliver Court described the facts as 
amounting to a secret "one-man grand 
jury"9 and held that the proceeding was 
unconstitutional under the Due Process 
Clause of the fourteenth amendment.lo 
by Frederick W. Goundry, III 
In addition, the Oliver Court noted that 
the public trial guarantee was exclu-
sively for the benefit and protection of 
the accused. I I 
In 1966, the Court decided the case of 
Sheppard v. Maxwell. 12 In Sheppard, the 
Court addressed the effect adverse pub-
licity had on a defendant's right to a fair 
trial.13 In reversing the defendant's con-
viction, the Court held that the defen-
dant was deprived of a fair trial because 
the trial judge failed to prevent "in-
herently prejudicial publicity."14 The 
Court indicated that a trial judge has a 
duty to ensure that prejudicial publicity 
never outweighs a defendant's right to a 
fair trial. IS This issue did not receive 
judicial scrutiny again for more than a 
decade l6 until the Court decided the 
case of Gannett Co. v. DePasquale. 17 
In Gannett, the trial judge ordered a 
pretrial hearing closed to the public and 
press upon motion by the defendant.18 
In upholding the closure order, the 
Gannett Court held that the constitu-
tion did not give the public an affirma-
tive right to open pretrial proceedings 
where both the prosecution and defense 
agreed that the defendant's fair trial 
rights would be put in serious jeopardy. 19 
The Gannett majority declined to con-
sider whether the first amendment car-
ries an independent "right of access" for 
the public and press to attend criminal 
proceedings.20 In dissent, Justice Black-
mun argued that the fourteenth amend-
ment prohibited courts from ordering 
closure without first considering the 
public's interest in maintaining an open 
proceeding.21 
ThefoUowingyear, the Supreme Court 
in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia22 
held for the first time that the constitu-
tion guarantees the right of the public 
and press to attend criminal trialS.23 In 
Richmond Newspapers, a defendant ac-
cused of murder requested that his trial 
be closed to avoid potential prejudice. 24 
Petitioner, a newspaper publishing com-
pany, argued that the trial judge should 
have first considered the alternatives be-
fore ordering the proceedings closed.2s 
In agreeing with the petitioner's posi-
tion, the Court concluded that there is a 
"presumption of openness" in criminal 
trials in the United States.26 The majority 
further noted that justice was best served 
by allowing the public to observe the 
proceedingsp and absent an overriding 
interest, the first amendment guaran-
teed this right of access.28 The Court 
noted, however, that the newly recog-
nized right of access was not absolute, 
and that trial courts would still be per-
mitted to impose reasonable restrictions 
to ensure that the defendant was given a 
fair trial.29 
Two years after Richmond News-
papers, the Court further defined the 
limitations of courtroom closure in 
GlobeNewspaperCo. v. Superior Court. 30 
The trial court in Globe Newspaper 
construed a Massachusetts statute as 
requiring mandatory closure during the 
testimony of a minor victim in a sex-
offense trial.31 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court held that the statute, as applied by 
the trial court, violated the first 
amendment.32 
The Globe Newspaper Court set forth 
a strict test for justifying closure in such 
cases. First, there must be a compelling 
governmental interest which requires 
denial of the public's right of access, and 
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second, the right must be narrowly tai-
lored to serve that interest.33 Applying 
the above test, the Court held that the 
state's interest in protecting minor vic-
tims of sex crimes from further trauma 
and embarrassment was not sufficiently 
compelling to permit mandatory clo-
sure.34 The Court also suggested that the 
trial court's closure order should have 
been more narrowly tailored to satisfy 
the requirements of the first amend-
ment.35 
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court36 (hereinafter 'Press-Enterprise 
1"), the Supreme Court considered 
whether constitutional guarantees of 
public trial extended to voir dire pro-
ceedings.37 In Press-Enterprise I, the trial 
judge allowed access during the "general 
voir dire," but then closed the remainder 
of the voir dire proceeding.38 After the 
jury was empaneled, the petitioner re-
quested a transcript of the closed por-
tion of voir dire, but the motion was 
denied by the trial judge in order to 
protect the privacy of the jurors.39 
The Press-Enterprise I Court applied 
the two-part test of Globe Newspaper4° 
and held that the presumption of open-
ness may be overcome only by a finding 
that an open proceeding would threaten 
an overriding interest, such as the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial or the pro-
spective jurors' privacy interests.41 By im-
plication, the Supreme Court extended 
the guarantee of public trial to voir dire 
proceedings.42 Chief Justice Burger, 
writing for the majority, said that clo-
sure must be "narrowly tailored to serve 
that [overriding] interest. "43 Also, the 
interest is to be clearly articulated along 
with specific findings so that an appel-
late court can determine the propriety 
of the closure order. 
This presumption, according to the 
Court, had not been rebutted in this 
case. In addition, the Court held that the 
trial judge had made no findings indicat-
ing that the alternatives to closure had 
even been considered.44 The decision 
appears to have rested on three key 
facts: (1) the trial judge refused to 
release the transcripts of the voir dire 
proceedings; (2) the trial judge failed to 
make particularized findings; and (3) 
the trial judge neglected to consider 
alternatives to closure.45 
The standard enunciated in Press-
Enterprise I has been applied in subse-
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quent cases in defining the constitu-
tional right to an open trial. For example, 
in Waller v. Georgia,46 the prosecution 
moved to close a pretrial suppression 
hearing, seeking to avoid unnecessary 
publicity which may have rendered some 
evidence inadmissible.47 The trial judge 
granted the motion and issued a closure 
order over the defendant's objection.48 
In reversing the trial court's decision, 
the Supreme Court held that the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to a public 
trial applied to pretrial suppression hear-
ings.49 The Supreme Court noted that 
the" explicit sixth amendment right of 
the accused is no less protective of a 
public trial than the implicit first 
amendment right of the press and pub-
lic. "50 As a result, the Waller decision 
expanded the "overriding interest" stan-
dard to criminal defendants who object 
to closure based on their sixth amend-
ment right to a public trial.51 
nthe interest is to be 
clearly articulated 
along with specific 
findings . ... " 
The most recent word from the Su-
preme Court on the right to public trial 
came in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court52 (hereinafter 'Press-Enterprise 
11"). In Press-Enterprise II, the presiding 
magistrate denied a motion by members 
of the news media to obtain access to 
transcripts of a preliminary hearing, cit-
ing potential prejudicial publicity, and 
ordered the record sealed. 53 On a writ of 
mandate, the California Supreme Court 
held that Press-Enterprise I and Globe 
Newspaper extended only to criminal 
trials. 54 
The Supreme Court, in Press-Enter-
prise II, held that the qualified first 
amendment right of access attaches at 
criminal preliminary hearings as con-
ducted in California. 55 Chief Justice 
Burger reasoned that "[b]ecause of its 
extensive scope, the preliminary hear-
ing is often the final and most important 
step in the criminal proceeding. "56 There-
fore, such preliminary hearings cannot 
be closed absent specific findings dem-
onstrating a "substantial probability" that 
closure was essential to preserve an 
overriding interest and unless such clo-
sure was closely tailored to serve that 
interest.57 The majority concluded that 
the closure order and the shielding of 
the preliminary hearing transcripts were 
inappropriate in such a case. 58 
Circumstances Where Closure Has 
Traditionally Been Justified 
The preceding Supreme Court deci-
sions define the scope of the sixth 
amendment right to a public trial and 
the first amendment right to access, and 
thus enunciate the constitutional stan-
dard for closure. Next, appellate court 
decisions where compelling interest suf-
ficient to warrant excluding the public 
and press from the courtroom was found 
will be discussed. 
It should be noted that when the trial 
judge wrongfully excludes the public or 
press from the courtroom, and the de-
fendant enters a timely objection, preju-
dice will be presumed; that is, the 
defendant will not have to show he was 
actually prejudiced. 59 At the same time, a 
defendant or his attorney may waive 
defendant'S right to a public trial either 
expressly or by failing to object to the 
closure order in a timely fashion. 
Closure to Prevent Disturbance by 
Spectators or Defendant 
Appellate courts have generally held 
that where, during the course of a trial, it 
appears that a disturbance caused by the 
defendant or spectators may lead to vio-
lence, the trial judge will be justified in 
excluding individuals from the court-
room.60 At the same time, the trial judge 
must still explore the reasonable alter-
natives in order to ensure that the de-
fendant has not been denied his sixth 
amendment right to a public trial.61 A 
closure order which extends beyond 
the actual need to prevent the disrup-
tion may violate the defendant's right to 
a fair trial.62 
Exclusion of Spectators to Avoid 
Intimidation of Witness 
Where a factual showing on the record 
is made that a witness was intimidated 
or threatened, an exclusion order, 
limited to the particular spectators re-
sponsible for the threats, has been held 
as not violative of the defendant's right 
to a public trial.63 On the other hand, 
appellate courts have been reluctant to 
approve an exclusion order in the 
absence of overtly menacing behavior 
on the part of the excluded spectators.64 
Also, it should be noted that some state 
constitutions contain provisions which 
may provide broader protection to the 
right to a public trial than the United 
States Constitution.65 Therefore, the ap-
plicable state provisions should be con-
sidered, along with the first and sixth 
amendments, in assessing the limitations 
on the trial court in excluding specta-
tors from the courtroom. 66 
Closure to Prevent Emotional 
Disturbance of Witness 
Generally, it is within a trial judge's 
discretion to exclude spectators from 
the courtroom during the testimony of a 
witness if it can be shown that such 
exclusion is reasonably necessary to 
prevent emotional disturbance of the 
witness or to enable the witness to tes-
tify.67 This rule has been held to be par-
ticularly applicable if the witness is a 
minor.68 Removal of all spectators from a 
courtroom, including the defendant's 
family,69 has been upheld where the trial 
judge has made specific findings that the 
nature of the testimony would be embar-
rassing to the witness and that the wit-
ness would be more comfortable testify-
ing without spectators.70 Also, it should 
be noted that it may be reversible error 
for the court to keep the courtroom 
locked, without further justification, 
during the testimony of other wit-
nesses.71 
Exclusion of Spectators Due to 
Overcrowding of Courtroom 
It is generally recognized that a trial 
judge may exclude persons not having 
an immediate connection with the trial 
to the extent that such exclusion is 
necessary to the prevention of over-
crowding of the courtroom. 72 Though 
there are few recent appellate cases on 
this issue, it seems clear that such neces-
sary exclusion of spectators does not 
deprive the defendant of his sixth 
amendment right to a public trial. 73 
Locking Courtroom Door During 
the Jury Charge 
It is common in both state and federal 
courts to lock the courtroom doors 
during the jury charge, thus prohibiting 
any additional entrants.74 This practice 
has been justified on the ground that the 
jury could be distracted during this crit-
ical phase of the trial.75 Many jurisdic-
tions lock the courtroom doors during 
the jury charge without making a deter-
mination whether a particular interest 
could be prejudiced by keeping the 
courtroom closed.76 
Exclusion by Way of Conducting 
Proceeding at Other than 
Regular Place or Time 
One alternative to actually locking the 
doors of the courtroom, which some 
trial courts have employed, is holding 
the criminal proceeding at a time or 
place different from the common time 
or place.77 Such a practice gives rise to 
many of the same concerns regarding 
the right to a public trial as closure of 
the courtroom. Appellate courts have 
had difficulty formulating rules for this 
issue and have generally analyzed cases 
on a factual basis. For example, courts 
presented with the problem have de-
cided that proceedings held on a week-
end78 or at night79 did not violate the 
defendant's sixth amendment right to a 
public trial. On the other hand, courts 
have split on the question of the propri-
ety of holding a criminal proceeding in 
the judge's chambers.80 
ff it may be reversible 
error. . . to keep the 
courtroom locked . ... " 
Conclusion 
Even though the right to a public trial 
is not absolute, the right may be limited 
only under very compelling circum-
stances. A trial judge has the discretion 
to exclude spectators only upon a find-
ing of an overriding interest which war-
rants closure. Even where such an inter-
est is found, the trial judge must consider 
the reasonable alternatives before order-
ing closure. Also, the closure order must 
be narrowly tailored so that it is no 
broader than necessary to protect that 
interest. This nation's tradition of open 
criminal proceedings should be con-
sidered in light ofthe defendant's right 
to a public trial, the public's right of 
access, and most importantly, the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial. 
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It can also help 
you reduce your weight. 
And since a 12-year study shows 
that being 40% or more overweight 
puts you at high risk, 
it makes sense to follow these 
guidelines for healthy living! 
Eat plenty of fruits and 
vegetables rich In vitamins A 
and C-oranges, cantaloupe, 
strawberries, peaches, apricots, 
broccoli, cauliflower, brussel 
sprouts, cabbage. Eat a high-
fiber, low-fat diet that Includes 
whole-graln breads and cereals 
such as oatmeal, bran and wheat. 
Eat lean meats, fish, skinned 
poultry and low-fat dairy 
products. Drink alcoholic 
beverages only in moderation. 
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